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NOTES AND COMMENTS
likely to assume its responsibility and clear up a well-defined, recur-
ring problem of the Bankruptcy Act.84
STEVEN E. LEwIs
THE SIXTH AMENDMENT AND THE RIGHT TO A
TRIAL BY A JURY OF THE VICINAGE
The sixth amendment to the United States Constitution enumer-
ates certain procedural rights guaranteed an accused "in all criminal
prosecutions."' Among the guarantees set forth by the amendment is
the right to be tried by a jury "of the State and district wherein the
crime shall have been committed." This provision, commonly re-
ferred to as the "vicinage" requirement, 2 specifies the geographic area
from which jurors in criminal proceedings must be drawn. It does not,
as is often mistakenly assumed, establish the venue in which the
proceedings themselves must take place.' However, because the jury
"iCongressional action has frequently been urged as a means of solving the priority
question of withholding taxes on pre-bankruptcy wages. For example, the Second
Circuit in Freedomland concluded:
We add only that to the extent there is now a conflict among the
circuits as to priorities of withholding taxes on pre-bankrutpcy wages
earned-the Eighth and Ninth Circuits going for the first, the Third
for the fourth and the Second for the second-correction may come
either from Congress or the High Court. . . . [The question has
some significance in the administration of bankrupt estates so that it
is perhaps well that after the 25 years that have elapsed since Fogarty
the matter might receive some further congressional or judicial atten-
tion.
480 F.2d at 191. See also Comment, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1103, 1108 (1965); Rutgers
Bankruptcy Note at 557, supra note 28.
'The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution was adopted by Con-
gress in 1789 as part of the Bill of Rights. It provides that:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall
have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with witnesses
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defense.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
2See text accompanying notes 48-50 infra.
3Only the Judiciary Article purports to restrict venue in criminal cases. Article III,
Section 2, clause 3 states that "such trial shall be held in the State where the said
crime shall have been committed." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 2.
1974]
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is traditionally selected from the area where the court presides, the
two concepts seem to be closely related.
The language of this provision has, until recently, received little
attention from the courts. In those instances in which the vicinage
concept has been discussed, it has generally been in connection with
challenges to the constitutionality of jury panels drawn from only a
portion of the judicial district involved. The defendants in such cases
have argued that the sixth amendment requires that jurors be se-
lected from the entire judicial district rather than a particular divi-
sion therein. Such assertions have been uniformly rejected by the
courts.4 Indeed, so rarely has the vicinage provision been successfully
raised in criminal appeals that it has been referred to as merely "an
anachronism unsuited for modern practice."'
Recently, however, the Supreme Court of California in construing
the language of the sixth amendment critically re-examined the tra-
ditional view of the vicinage provision. In the case of People v. Jones,6
the court concluded that the vicinage concept was an essential fea-
ture of trial by jury and, consequently, was binding on the states
under the fourteenth amendment. 7 In its decision, the California
court adopted a new and potentially significant interpretation of the
jury requirements specified in the sixth amendment. Reversing a
lower court decision, it held that the area from which jurors in crimi-
nal proceedings are drawn must include the locality where the crime
was committed. In light of several recent Supreme Court opinions
requiring that an accused be given a fair and speedy trial," this inter-
'For example, in Ruthenberg v. United States, 245 U.S. 480 (1918), the plaintiff
in error argued that he had not been tried by a jury of the State and district in which
the crime was committed because the jurors were drawn from only one division of the
district. Chief Justice White rejected this contention, stating that:
The proposition disregards the plain text of the Sixth Amendment,
the contemporary construction placed upon it by the Judiciary Act of
1789, expressly authorizing the jury from a part of the district, and the
continuous judicial practice from the beginning.
Id. at 482. See United States v. Titus, 210 F.2d 210 (2d Cir. 1954); United States v.
Ayers, 46 F. 651 (D.S. Dak. 1891).
5F. HELLER, THE SixTH AMENDMENT 95 (1951) [hereinafter cited as HELLER].
9 Cal. 3d 546, 510 P.2d 705, 108 Cal. Rptr. 345 (1973).
7Those provisions of the sixth amendment which have been made specifically
applicable to the states by reason of the fourteenth amendment include the right to a
public trial, In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257 (1948); to counsel, Gideon v. Wainwright, 372
U.S. 335 (1963); to confrontation, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965); to a fair and
speedy trial, Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967); to compulsory process in
obtaining witnesses, Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967); to trial by jury, Duncan
v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
8In Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967), the Supreme Court held that
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pretation of the vicinage provision could have a major impact on both
federal and state criminal practice and procedure.9
The vicinage issue in Jones arose as a result of a procedural ad-
justment made in the Los Angeles County court system to accommo-
date rising case loads. The defendant, Dwight Leon Jones, was ar-
rested in the 77th Street Los Angeles Police Department Precinct and
charged with three counts of selling marijuana and one count of sell-
ing restricted dangerous drugs. Although the criminal acts in ques-
tion took place within the 77th Precinct which was located in the
Central Superior Court District of Los Angeles County, Jones was
arraigned and brought to trial in the Southwest Superior Court Dis-
trict." The transfer took place pursuant to an order entered by the
Presiding Judge of the Central District temporarily assigning all
criminal cases arising out of the 77th Precinct to the Southwest Dis-
trict.I This order had been given in an effort to alleviate the crowded
condition of the docket in the Central District.
2
the sixth amendment right to a speedy trial affords affirmative protection against
unjust postponement of trial for an accused and was among the fundamental rights
applicable to the states under the fourteenth amendment. See also Barker v. Wingo,
407 U.S. 514 (1972); United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307 (1971).
'The prosecution in People v. Jones did not seek to have the United States Su-
preme Court review the decision of the California court because there were other
grounds for reversal. This same issue is likely to be brought before the Supreme Court
of California again, however, as a result of the case of People v. Bernstein, No. 72-1179
(Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 28, 1973) (not to be published in the official reports), wherein the
defendant was tried and found guilty of the sale of a narcotic by a jury drawn from
the Santa Maria area of Santa Barbara County. The criminal acts were allegedly
committed in the City of Santa Barbara, however. The court of appeals reversed the
judgment of the lower court and ordered that a new trial be held consistent with the
vicinage requirements set forth in Jones. The manner in which the California Supreme
Court disposes of the Bernstein case, if the decision is appealed, may determine
whether the vicinage issue is carried to the United States Supreme Court.
"0Due to the rapid growth in the population of the area, Los Angeles County
established eight judicial districts designed to supplement that portion of the court
system retained at the county seat, now located in the Central District. The branch
courts have jurisdiction over all cases arising within their boundries as well as all others
assigned to them from other areas of the county. Jurors are drawn from the geographic
area over which the particular branch court presides. Thus, the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County sits concurrently in nine geographic areas constituting specifically
named districts. See Adams v. Superior Court of Los Angeles County, 27 Cal. App. 3d
719, 104 Cal. Rptr. 144 (Ct. App. 1972).
"The order was issued on May 26, 1970, by the Presiding Judge of the Central
District. It was anticipated that the Central District would again assume jurisdiction
over the 77th Precinct in the fall of 1972 with the completion of the new criminal courts
building in Los Angeles. 108 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
'"The transfer of these cases took place pursuant to Rule 2, § 5 of the Rules of the
Superior Court of Los Angeles County which reads:
19741
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Jones objected to being tried in the Southwest District, however,
and moved to transfer the case back to the Central District where the
alleged crimes had occurred. His motion to transfer was based on the
contention that potential jurors from the 77th Precinct were system-
atically excluded from the jury in the Southwest District. '3 Particular
emphasis was placed on the fact that thirty-one per cent of the popu-
lation of the Central District was black as compared with only seven
per cent in the Southwest District." Jones, himself black, argued that
exclusion of potential jurors drawn from the 77th Precinct constituted
a violation of the right to be tried by a fair and impartial jury selected
from a cross section of the community.15 After hearing the arguments,
the court denied the motion and set the case for trial. On October 14,
1971, the jury returned a verdict of guilty whereupon Jones was sent-
enced to the state prison for a term prescribed by law.
Jones appealed his conviction to the California Court of Appeals
for the Second Appellate District, 6 asserting that he had been denied
the right to a trial by a jury of the vicinage 17 as guaranteed by the
sixth amendment. 18 The appellate court rejected this claim conclud-
Whenever, in the opinion of the Presiding Judge, the calendar in any
district, including the Central District has become so congested as to
jeopardize the right of a party to a speedy trial or to materially inter-
fere with the proper handling of the judicial district, he may order the
transfer of one or more cases pending in that district to another dis-
trict for trial or may order for a limited period, that cases which may
be filed in that district be filed in a different district.
104 Cal. Rptr. at 347 quoting L.A. SUPER. CT. R. 2(5).
'3Despite the transfer of all criminal cases arising out of the 77th Precinct to the
Southwest District, residents of the area continued to serve on juries sitting in the
Central District. 108 Cal. Rptr. at 347. Although the court makes reference to the
"systematic exclusion" of jurors from the 77th Precinct which resulted from the order,
there is no indication that the court meant to imply that the transfer of these cases
was in any way motivated by racial considerations.
"With the exception of a period from December 23, 1969, to July 6, 1971, jurors
for the Central District were, however, selected from Los Angeles County at large which
has a black population of only eleven per cent. 104 Cal. Rptr. at 148.
15Had the population of the 77th Precinct been merged with that of the Southwest
District, the percentage of blacks in the area from which the jury would have been
drawn would have risen to twenty-three per cent. 108 Cal. Rptr. at 347.
6People v. Jones, 27 Cal. App. 2d 98, 103 Cal. Rptr. 475 (Ct. App. 1972).
"7While the term "vicinage" as used by the appellant was never specifically de-
fined in the written brief which was submitted to the court, it appears from the context
in which it was employed that it was intended to refer to a geographic area inclusive
of the vicinity where the crime was committed.
"8Whether the vicinage requirement of the sixth amendment is, in fact, applicable
to the states has not yet been decided by the United States Supreme Court. The
Court's opinion in Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78 (1970), indicates, however, that it
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ing that the vicinage provision requires only that the jury be drawn
from within Los Angeles County, without reference to any specific
locality therein. In its denial of the request for reversal, the court
specifically refused to adopt the narrow interpretation of vicinage
which was urged upon it, stating that" 'vicinage' cannot be so restric-
tively defined as to mean 'the precise area' of the crime. No definition
of 'vicinage' would result but only a new problem of defining
'area.' "19
The California Supreme Court was unpersuaded by the reasoning
of the lower court and in a four to three decision, reversed Jones'
conviction. It concluded that the sixth amendment preserved as an
essential feature of trial by jury, the common law right to a jury
drawn from the vicinage. In so doing, the court relied heavily upon
language in the decisions of Alvarado v. State" and Maryland v.
Brown.2 ' The Alvarado case, decided by the Supreme Court of
Alaska, involved the right of an accused to an impartial jury drawn
from a fair cross section of the community.22 Brown, on the other
hand, dealt with the propriety of a petition for removal of an action
from the state courts.2u Based upon these decisions, the California
court held that while the language of the sixth amendment may have
enlarged the area from which the jury might be drawn, Congress in
adopting the amendment in 17894 nevertheless intended that "[t]he
district, however large or small . .. include the area wherein the
crime was committed. ' '
Any conclusion as to the collective intent of the drafters of the
amendment such as that rendered by the Jones court must necessar-
ily be speculative in nature. However, the relevant historical material
tracing the development of the vicinage provision from its common
law origins appears to cast considerable doubt upon the validity of
the position taken by the California Supreme Court.
The concept of a jury selected exclusively from the vicinity in
which the crime was committed dates back to the very origins of the
may be that the vicinage concept, unlike the common law right to a jury of twelve,
was among the fundamental rights preserved by the sixth amendment.
1"103 Cal. Rptr. at 479.
"486 P.2d 891 (Alas. 1971).
21205 F. Supp. 63 (D. Md. 1969).
2See text accompanying notes 59-62 infra.
n'See text accompanying notes 63-65 infra.
21The final version of the amendment was adopted by the House on September
24, and the Senate on September 25, 1789. It was thereupon submitted to the States
for ratification. 2 B. SCHwARTz, THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1159 (1971).
25108 Cal. Rptr. at 351.
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Anglo-American jury system. 6 The juror of the 15th Century was
expected to decide cases on the basis of his personal knowledge of the
facts at issue. Coming from the area, it was assumed that the juror
knew the character of the parties and witnesses and thus was capable
of evaluating the credibility of their testimony.Y It was therefore
axiomatic that jurors of one county could not be drawn to hear cases
involving crimes committed in another county.'
Between the years 14689 and 1765, however, there occurred a
gradual deterioration in the absolute nature of the vicinage rule
which was reflected in the changing character of the jury itself2
0
Notably, by 1764, jurors were considered to be "as white Paper,
[knowing] neither Plaintiff nor Defendant, but [judging] the Issue
merely an abstract Proposition."'31 While jurors selected fromthe lo-
cality where the crime took place provided certain procedural advan-
tages, the realization that personal knowledge often became inter-
twined with personal prejudice called into question the validity of an
unqualified vicinage requirement.3 2 So weakened was the vicinage
concept by the late 1700's that Lord Mansfield, speaking for the court
in Rex v. Crowl e, 33 not only upheld the right of the Crown to move
for a change of venue but also permitted it to empanel jurors from
the area to which the proceedings were transferred .3 Thus, by 1774,
"Cf. Note, 1 CAL. L. Rav. 272 (1913).
213 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 359-60 (15th ed. 1809).
"The early common law jury was a body of neighbors called upon to decide dis-
puted questions of fact. Being from the area they were either acquainted with the facts
or could easily acquire the necessary knowledge of them. Thus, the early English juror
was a witness to the facts rather than a judge of them. 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY
OF ENGLISH LAW 317 (4th ed. 1927).
"By 1468, the jury as we know it had emerged in rather a rudimentary form.
Blume, The Place of Trial of Criminal Cases: Constitutional Vicinage and Venue, 43
MICH. L. REv. 59, 60 (1944) [hereinafter cited as Blume], citing T. PLUNKETr, A
CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW, 120-21 (2d ed. 1956).
"By the latter part of the 17th Century, jurors had lost their character as wit-
nesses. However, their alternate character as judges had become predominant as early
as the 14th Century, 1 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 318 (4th ed. 1972).
3'Blume at 60-61 quoting Mylock v. Saladine, 1 Wm. Blackstone Rep. 480, 481
(1781).
UAs was noted by Zlackstone in his commentaries on English common law:
[Tihis convenience [of drawing jurors from the neighborhood] was
overbalanced by another very natural and almost unavoidable incon-
venience; that jurors, coming out of the immediate neighborhood,
would be apt to intermix their prejudices and partialities in the trial
of right.
W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 359-60 (15th ed. 1809).
"2 Burr. 834, 97 Eng. Rep. 587 (K.B. 1759).
3"Mansfield justified his decision on the grounds that where a fair trial could not
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it would appear that the common law of England no longer guaran-
teed an accused in criminal prosecutions the absolute right to be tried
by a jury drawn from the place where the alleged crime was commit-
ted.1
5
This movement away from an absolute vicinage rule was not con-
fined to England but was evident in the American colonies as well.
Despite their vigorous defense of their common law heritage, the
colonists found themselves unable to comply in all cases with a rigid
requirement that jurors in criminal proceedings be drawn from the
vicinage.36 This is not to imply, however, that the colonial legislatures
abandoned the basic tenets of the English jury system. Quite to the
contrary, the colonists at all times believed that they had brought
with them the inalienable right to trial by jury.
7
Moreover, it can be said that the Crown's attempt to usurp this
right was among the factors which hastened the American Revolu-
tion. In resurrecting certain statutory provisions originally enacted
under Henry VIII, the Parliament in 1769 vested in the king the right
to designate the place of trial for any act of treason committed within
the realm.3 The specter of colonists being transported to England to
stand trial pursuant to these statutes brought loud protests from the
colonial legislatures and was among the grievances enumerated in the
be had in the place where the crime was committed, venue should properly be changed.
However, a change of venue would be futile were the jury still drawn from the locality
where the acts were committed. Adherence to a strict vicinage rule under such circum-
stances, according to Mansfield, would "be most absurd: because it would really be
putting the place out of the protection of the law; and there must, in many important
cases, be a total failure of trial, and consequently, of justice." Id. at 602.
5See Newberry v. Commonwealth, 192 Va. 819, 66 S.E.2d 841 (1951).
3'Virginia, for example, in adopting the statutes of 1661-62 establishing procedural
rules of court, expressed regret at not being able to comply with the requirement of
the British jury system that jurors be drawn from the vicinage. P. Reinsch, Colonial
Common Law, in 1 SELECT ESSAYS IN ANGLO-AMEmCAN LEGAL HIsTORY 367, 405 (1907).
"This is attested to by their resistance to any diminution of this right by either
their Royal Governors or the King's Ministers. Connor, The Constitutional Right To
A Trial By A Jury Of The Vicinage, 57 U. PA. L. REv. 197 (1909).
2-In response to violent acts by the people of Massachusetts Bay, the House of
Commons on January 26, 1769, approved an address to the King which recommended:
. . . that you will be graciously pleased to direct your Majesty's gover-
nor of Massachusetts Bay to take the most effectual methods for pro-
curing the fullest information . . . touching all treason . . . in order
that your Majesty may issue a special commission for enquiring of,
hearing, and determining the aid offences within this realm, pursuant
to . . . the statute of the 35th year of the reign of King Henry the
eighth.
Speakers opposing the proposal that persons accused of treason in Massachusetts be
tried in England warned that such a measure might lead to war. Blume at 63-64.
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Declaration of Independence. 9 The First Continental Congress de-
clared in 1774 that all colonists had the "great and inestimable privi-
lege of being tried by their peers of the vicinage."40 It is apparent,
however, that the term "vicinage" as employed during this period
was not intended to convey the technical meaning of trial by jurors
of a particular county or neighborhood. Rather, it was invoked in an
effort to escape the danger of standing trial in some other colony or
in England itself.'
As a result of the abuses by the Crown, the jury trial clause of
Article I of the United States Constitution was subjected to close
scrutiny and severe criticism upon submission to the states for ratifi-
cation. Many expressed the fear that the Constitution, by failing to
establish any vicinage requirement, vested in the federal government
the same power which the Crown had misused.12 This lack of specific
language guaranteeing the right to trial by a jury of the vicinage was
one of a number of concerns which ultimately led to the adoption of
the Bill of Rights . 3 On June 8, 1789, James Madison introduced nine
proposals in the House of Representatives,4 one of which set forth
certain rights guaranteed an accused in all criminal proceedings. It
provided, in part, that "[t]he trial of all crimes . . . shall be by an
impartial jury of freeholders of the vicinage, with the requisite unan-
imity for conviction. . . . "I Substantial disagreement arose in Con-
gress over the proper interpretation to be applied to the term "vicin-
age." Numerous amendments were offered in the House advocating
broader or narrower interpretations of that term. A similar debate
took place in the Senate where various changes were made in Madi-
son's original proposal. A joint committee was finally appointed in an
attempt to resolve the discrepancies between the versions passed by
3The drafters of the Declaration of Independence cited as evidence of the King's
tyranny, the transporting of colonists beyond the Seas to be tried for pretended offen-
ses. Id. at 66.
'Old. at 65 quoting 2 H. COMMAGER, DocuMENTs OF AMERICAN HISTORY 83-84 (2d ed.
1940).
"Blume at 66.
12Patrick Henry, in the Virginia Ratification Convention, objected to the lack of a
narrowly drawn vicinage provision. Protesting against this omission, Henry declared
that "this great privilege . . . is prostrated by this paper the [proposed Constitution].
Juries from the vicinage being not secured, this right is in reality sacrificed. All is
gone. . . ." HELLER at 25. Similar fears were expressed in Massachusetts and other
states considering the adoption of the Constitution. Id. 25-27. Williams v. Florida, 399
U.S. 78, 93-94 (1970).




11399 U.S. at 94, quoting 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 435 (1789).
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the two houses."
The difficulty, as noted by Madison himself, was that there was
a lack of uniformity among the states in the jury selection process.
In a number of states the jury was drawn from the state at large; in
others it was drawn from districts. In only a few were jurors selected
from the county alone." There was not, as the California court in
Jones seems to imply, a common understanding of the vicinage re-
quirement as it existed at common law.
The conflict as to the meaning of this term reflected a basic disa-
greement concerning the proper role to be played by the federal gov-
ernment. 8 The substitution of the phrase "of the State and district
wherein the crime shall have been committed" for the term "vicin-
age" in the final version of the sixth amendment represented a com-
promise between those who wished to limit the vicinage to the county
in which a crime had been committed and those who desired to mini-
mize any restrictions on the power of the federal government. 9 By
tying the concept of vicinage to the boundaries of the state and dis-
trict where the crime was committed, the First Congress assured that
an accused would not be transported to a foreign state to stand trial.
At the same time, Congress left to its successors the problem of pre-
cisely defining the vicinage requirement within those boundaries
which it had established."
The compromise language which was finally adopted may, of
course, be interpreted as merely enlarging, beyond the county where
the crime occurred, the area from which potential jurors may be
drawn. Following the reasoning of the California court, the presumed
requirement that the specific locality where the acts were committed
be included in the area from which the jury is selected would remain
unchanged by this compromise agreement.5' Acceptance of this posi-
"¢The House appointed Madison as one of its managers for the conference. His
account of the proceedings serves as the only source of information regarding the
deliberations which occurred between the representatives of the Senate and House.
HELLER at 32.
471d.
"The Federalists opposed any restriction upon the exercise of the judicial power
of the national government. There were those, however, who favored only a limited
federal government and who, therefore, advocated restricting the vicinage to the
county where the crime occurred. Id. at 93.
49Id.
I*Id. at 93. By expressing the vicinage concept in terms of judicial districts, Con-
gress, in the future, could redefine the area from which the jury must be drawn by
simply amending the Judiciary Act which delineates the boundaries of those districts.
"Such reasoning fails to take into consideration the contemporaneous construction
placed upon the amendment by the Judiciary Act of 1789 which was enacted the day
19741
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tion, however, ignores substantial judicial authority to the effect that
the sixth amendment merely defines the outer limits of the vicinage
without establishing any particular requirements within those lim-
its.52 As stated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit in Seadlund v. United States,53 the vicinage provision of the
sixth amendment means "nothing more than that the jury cannot be
selected from without or beyond the District."54
This is substantially the view taken recently by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in United States v. Florence,55
an opinion relied upon by the dissent in Jones. In Florence, the defen-
dant, a resident of Parkersburg, West Virginia, was indicted for draft
evasion after failing to report for induction at the Parkersburg re-
cruiting station. Despite the fact that all of the alleged acts took place
within the Parkersburg division of the Northern District of West Vir-
ginia, the defendant was tried in the Elkins division. As a result,
jurors from the Parkersburg area were excluded from the jury selected
to hear the case. On appeal, the defendant asserted that the jurors
chosen for service in the Elkins division did not meet the constitu-
tional or statutory requirements of a jury to try his case.56 Without
specifically referring to the sixth amendment, the court concluded
that the defendant "had neither a constitutional nor statutory right
before the final version of the sixth amendment was adopted. That Act established the
first federal districts, whose boundaries in all but two instances coincided with the
boundaries of the several States. Id. at 94. Moreover, the Act provided, in part, that:
[Jiurors shall . . . be returned . . . from such parts of the district
from time to time, as the court shall direct, so as shall be most
favourable to an impartial trial, and so as not to incur an unnecessary
expense, or unduly to burthen the citizens of any part of the district
with such services.
Act of Sept. 24, 1789, ch. 20, § 29, 1 Stat. 88. See also United States v. Peuschel, 116
F. 642, 646 (S.D. Cal. 1902), Nowhere does the language of the Act provide that the
jury must be selected from a particular area of the district which specifically includes
the locality where the crime was committed. Furthermore, if Congress wanted to leave
no doubt that it was incorporating existing common-law features of the jury system
into the Constitution, it knew how to express language to that effect.
"See Franklin v. United States, 384 F.2d 377, 378 (5th Cir. 1967); Lafoon v. United
States, 250 F.2d 958, 959 (5th Cir. 1958); McNealy v. Johnston, 100 F.2d 280, 282 (9th
Cir. 1938); United States v. Peuschell, 116 F. 642, 646 (S.D. Cal. 1902).
-97 F.2d 742 (7th Cir. 1938).
11Id. at 747.
-456 F.2d 46 (4th Cir. 1972).
"Because of the political nature of the crime with which he was charged, Franklin
may have felt that he would have received a more favorable verdict were he tried by
an urban jury in Parkersburg, a city of 50,000. Elkins, by way of contrast, is a much
smaller rural community.
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to a district-wide jury nor to a jury selected from the Parkersburg
'division.' ,,57
The majority in Jones chose to ignore the Fourth Circuit's opinion
in Florence and to rely instead upon the decisions of Alvarado v.
State 58 and Maryland v. Brown" in resolving the vicinage question
before it. In so doing, the California court summarily dismissed a long
line of cases which have held that judicial divisions have no constitu-
tional significance and that it is the district which defines the vicin-
age."0 Yet, neither Alvarado nor Brown appears to lend substantial
support to the manner in which the judicial and historical develop-
ment of the vicinage provision was disposed of by the Jones court.
While the Alaska Supreme Court did hold that the defendant in
Alvarado was entitled to a reversal on the grounds that the area from
which the jury was selected failed to include the village where the
crime occurred, the decision was carefully limited to and predicated
upon cultural features unique to Alaska. The defendant was one-
quarter Aleut and had lived in the Village of Chignick more than half
his life. The jurors, by way of contrast, were drawn from only that
portion of the judicial division encompassing the urban area of An-
chorage and its surrounding suburbs. It seems apparent that the
primary concern of the court was not the vicinage requirement of the
sixth amendment. Rather, the focus of the court's attention was di-
r7Id. at 50.
0486 P.2d 891 (Alas. 1971).
11295 F. Supp. 63 (D. Md. 1969).
"The court distinguished these cases on the grounds that in all of them the crime
had apparently been committed within the division from which the jury was drawn.
108 Cal. Rptr. at 351. This does not appear to have been the case, however, in McNealy
v. Johnston, 100 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1938). There the defendant appealed a sentence
imposed upon him by the Federal District court for the Northern Division of the
Southern District of Alabama alleging that the court lacked jurisdiction to entertain
his plea of guilty. Although no jury was involved, the court, nevertheless, stated that
the sixth amendment relates "only to the 'state and district' where the offense is
committed. There is no constitutional prohibition against trial being had in a division
of the district other than the division in which the offense was committed." Id. at 282.
Implicit in the court's decision was the assumption that if there were a jury in any such
case, it would be selected from the area over which the court presided.
Furthermore, in Franklin v. United States, 384 F.2d 377 (5th Cir. 1967) the court
specifically stated that the defendant had no constitutional right under the sixth
amendment to a trial in the division where the crime occurred. In that case, the
defendant was tried in the Macon Division of the Middle District of Georgia despite
the fact that the crime occurred in the Albany Division. See United States v. Anderson,
328 U.S. 699, 704-05 (1946); Barrett v. United States, 169 U.S. 218 (1898); Lafoon v.
United States, 250 F.2d 958 (5th Cir. 1958); Carrillo v. Squier, 137 F.2d 648 (9th Cir.
1943); Marvel v. Zerbst, 83 F.2d 974 (10th Cir.), aff'd per curiam, 299 U.S. 518 (1936).
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rected at the question of whether the jury, as selected, represented a
fair cross section of the community." This seems particularly evident
in light of the court's statement that:
[t]he source of prospective jurors must [not] in all instances
include residents of the place in which the crime was allegedly
committed, for it is conceivable that the source of prospective
jurors may exclude the scene of the alleged offense, yet...
reasonably represent a cross section of the community ....
Thus, several decisions imply that selection of prospective ju-
rors from a restricted area within the judicial district, even if
the scene of the crime is omitted from the area, will be accepta-
ble. ... 62
This language, which was quoted by the dissent in Jones, seems to
contradict the proposition that the region from which the jury is
drawn "must include the area where the crime was committed."63
The implications of the foregoing appear, moreover, to be in no
way diminished by the decision of the federal district court in
Maryland v. Brown." The principal issue in that proceeding was
whether the defendant's petition for removal of his case to federal
court should be granted.6 5 The defendant based his request on a num-
ber of assertions, one of which was that the State of Maryland by
transferring his case from Dorchester to Hartford County had denied
him the right to a jury drawn from the district where the crime
occurred as guaranteed by the sixth amendment. Although the court
did not reach the merits of the defendant's constitutional argument,
it did state that Brown might have the right to be tried by Dorchester
County residents even if the trial were held in Hartford. The court
cited no authority for this proposition but went on to note that the
state could satisfy whatever right Brown might have by simply draw-
ing the jury from the state at large. Such an alternative does not
appear any more favorable to the defendant and arguably could com-
"The cultural distinction between Anchorage and Cignick appears to have been
uppermost in the minds of the court in Alvarado. These same concerns are also evident
in the Jones decision, especially in light of the emphasis placed upon the racial imbal-
ance which existed between the Central and Southwest Districts.
52486 P.2d at 902 n.29.
"108 Cal. Rptr. at 351 (emphasis added).
"295 F. Supp. 63 (D. Md. 1969).
'"In Brown, the defendant, H. Rap Brown, was indicted by a grand jury in Dorches-
ter County on one count of arson, one count of the common-law crime of exciting to
riot, and one count of the common-law crime of riot. Due to racial unrest in Baltimore,
the prosecution was granted a change of venue pursuant to Maryland law. Brown
objected to the change of venue and sought to have his case removed from the state
court.
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plicate the orderly administration of the jury selection process."
The court concluded, however, that even if Brown's interpretation
of the sixth amendment were valid, it did not constitute sufficient
grounds for removal. It is apparent, therefore, that the court's discus-
sion of the vicinage question was primarily dicta and not essential to
the disposition of the case. Thus, the Brown decision, although sup-
portive of the Jones position, can hardly be deemed persuasive au-
thority as to the vicinage question.
It would appear then that neither Alvarado nor Brown can be said
to conclusively establish the validity of the decision reached in Jones.
The United States Supreme Court, if presented with the issue, may
accept the California court's interpretation of the vicinage provision
if it should conclude that exclusion of jurors from the place where the
crime occurred would seriously undermine the ability of the jury to
function as the "conscience of the community" in discharging its
duties." If the jury is to serve as an ameliorating force, tempering the
rigidity of the law and the professionals who administer it, it would
seem that the jurors must necessarily possess an understanding of the
realities of the community where the crime occurred.68
Implicit in this view of the criminal justice system is the principle
of jury nullification, the right to acquit even when to do so would be
contrary to both the evidence and the law. As was noted by the
Fourth Circuit in United States v. Moylan,69 this power must exist
"It would appear that such a rule would require a special jury panel be drawn in
each instance where a change of venue was granted at the prosecution's request. The
added cost and time involved in such a procedure would likely deter the court from
granting any such motions unless there were strong countervailing considerations.
"TAs was noted by Judge Wright in his dissent in Everett v. United States, 336 F.2d
979 (D.C. Cir. 1964), the jury's verdict is more than a mere mechanical application of
the law.
Reflected in the jury's decision is a judgment of whether, under all the
circumstances of the event and in the light of all known about the
defendant, the prohibited act, if committed, deserves condemnation
by the law.
Id. at 985-86.
The importance of the jury in our system of criminal justice was re-emphasized
by the Supreme Court in Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), wherein the Court
stated:
A right to jury trial is granted to criminal defendants in order to
prevent oppression by the Government. Those who wrote our constitu-
tions knew from history and experience that it was necessary to pro-
tect against unfounded criminal charges brought to eliminate ene-
mies ....
Id. at 155-56.
11417 F.2d 1002 (4th Cir. 1969).
1974]
412 WASHINGTON AND LEE LAW REVIEW [Vol. XXXI
so long as our judicial system adheres to the general verdict in crimi-
nal proceedings.7 1 In our courts, it is the jury which applies the law
to the facts of the case and determines the culpability of the ac-
cused. 7' If it is to properly function as the conscience of the com-
munity, however, it must be able to freely evaluate the defendant's
conduct in light of the community's values. Jury nullification pro-
vides a means whereby the community may say of a particular law




The principle of jury nullification can be severely limited, how-
ever, if the government is permitted to transfer cases from one area
to another in order to secure jurors more favorably disposed to the
prosecution's case. It may be, for instance, that jurors from the 77th
Precinct in Jones would not find the selling of marijuana as offensive
as jurors from the Southwest District. Thus, Jones might receive a
more favorable verdict were he tried by members of the community
where the alleged crimes took place.
73
It is arguable that if our judicial system is to retain an air of
legitimacy, the jury must be able to act according to the mores of the
community and the accused must feel that the disposition of his case
reflects this. Otherwise, the judicial system could become so inflexi-
ble as to endanger the authoritativeness of decisions made through
the legal process. 74 This may prove to be the most compelling argu-
"Despite the fact that the court reaffirmed the jury nullification principle, it
rejected the appellant's contention that the trial court had erred in failing to instruct
the jury as to this point. According to the court, the "jury should [not] be instructed
that it may disregard the law as declared by the judge." 417 F.2d at 1007. See also
United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165 (1st Cir. 1969) (upholding the principle of the
general verdict in criminal proceedings).
7'The Supreme Court, in the landmark case of Sparf and Hansen v. United States,
156 U.S. 51 (1895), affirmed the role of the jury as the final arbitrator in criminal
proceedings. Courts today continue to adhere to this policy by refraining from ques-
tioning the wisdom of the jury's verdict. 417 F.2d at 1007.
72See Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right To Say No, 45 So. CAL. L. REv. 168
(1972).
3This is not to imply that the jury is free to pick and choose with impunity what
laws should and should not be obeyed. This is not nor has it ever been the role of the
jury in our system of criminal justice. However, the jury must be able to consider the
totality of the circumstances surrounding the case if it is to avoid becoming merely a
ministerial agent of the court. See Kunstler, Jury Nullification In Conscience Cases,
10 Va. J. Int'L. L. 71 (1961).
7The legitimizing role which the jury performs takes on added significance where,
as in Jones, there are racial factors to be taken into consideration. It appears evident
that an accused of one race who is tried before a jury composed of members of another
race cannot help but question the impartiality of those who will determine his guilt or
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ment in favor of the result reached in the Jones decision. 5
These considerations must be weighed, however, against the dis-
ruptive impact which acceptance of the California court's interpreta-
tion of the vicinage provision would be likely to have on both state
and federal criminal procedure. Assuming that courts continue to
draw jurors from the area in which the trial court presides, a strict
vicinage rule would seem likely to have a dilatory effect upon the
disposition of criminal prosecutions. Criminal courts would no longer
be able to alleviate crowded dockets by transferring proceedings to
less congested courts within the county or judicial district. Thus, an
already over-burdened criminal justice system would be further lim-
ited in the efficient utilization of available judicial resources. 6
A rigid application of the vicinage concept and the resulting con-
straints which would likely be placed upon the administration of
court proceedings become all the more significant in light of the con-
tinuing emphasis being placed upon the right to a fair and speedy
trial. In Klopfer v. North Carolina,17 the Supreme Court held that a
speedy trial was among the fundamental rights guaranteed an ac-
cused by the sixth amendment and, therefore, was applicable to the
states under the fourteenth amendment. While the Court has not
attempted to establish criteria by which compliance with the require-
innocence. Where the racial distinctions between the jury and the accused are the
result of a transfer of the proceedings from one area to another, the validity of the entire
judicial process would seem to be seriously undermined in the eyes of the accused.
75The foregoing discussion is predicated upon the assumption that the vicinage
question will ultimately reach the Supreme Court. It is possible that the Supreme
Court of the United States might be able to reach the same result as that in the Jones
decision while, at the same time, avoiding the constitutional issue altogether.
This was substantially the result reached in Dupont v. United States, 388 F.2d
39 (5th Cir. 1967). There, the defendant was tried in the Valdosta Division of the
Middle District of Georgia although the crimes were alleged to have taken place in the
Thomasville Division. The court did not dispute the right of the district court to assign
the case to any division in the district. It did, however, hold that the court had abused
its discretion in failing to take into consideration the convenience of the accused in
assigning the case.
In Jones, it is at least arguable that the Presiding Judge of the Central District
abused his discretion in transferring all cases from the 77th Precinct by failing to take
into consideration the racial distinctions which existed between the Southwest District
and the 77th Precinct.
"As of June 30, 1970, more than 6,000 federal district court criminal cases (30%
of all pending) had been awaiting trial one year or more. Note, Speedy Trial Schemes
and Criminal Justice Delay, 57 CORNELL L. REv. 794 n.4 (1972), citing THE JUncIAL
CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES CouRTs, ANNUAL REPORT 1970 at 155-57 (1971).
p386 U.S. 213 (1967).
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ments of this provision may be assessed, 8 numerous state legislatures
have enacted statutes specifying strict time limitations within which
trial must occur." In order to comply with these statutory provisions
as well as to adhere to the mandate of the Supreme Court, the crimi-
nal justice system has been under considerable pressure to modify
existing administrative procedures and thereby increase overall effi-
ciency.
In the City of New York, for example, special narcotics courts
have been established in response to what was deemed "an emer-
gency of grave dimensions."8 As was the situation in the Central
District of Los Angeles, the criminal dockets in New York during the
late sixties became seriously overcrowded. The extent of the crisis
which engulfed the New York City court system is illustrated by the
fact that of those detained in jail while awating trial in 1968, forty-
three per cent were held over one year."' The inability of the tradi-
tional criminal justice system in New York to efficiently dispose of
the cases before it was due primarily to the rapid increase in the
volume of drug related offenses.
2
The special narcotics courts were created to facilitate centraliza-
tion of the prosecution of drug related offenses in an effort to increase
efficiency in the judicial process.u These courts were vested with city-
wide jurisdiction to hear all drug cases regardless of the particular
county within the city where the alleged crime occurred., Under this
statutory scheme both grand and petit juries were to continue to be
drawn from the county where the court presided and not from the
several counties within New York City at large.8 Thus, a defendant
"Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1973). "The nature of the speedy trial right does
make it impossible to pinpoint a precise time in the process when the right must be
asserted or waived .. " Id. at 527.
'In California, for example, it is provided that where a defendant is not brought
to trial within 60 days after being indicted, the action must be dismissed unless good
cause to the contrary can be shown. CAL. PENAL CODE § 1382 (West 1972).
-N.Y. JunIciARY LAW § 177(a) (McKinney Supp. 1972).
"Note, The All-Purpose Parts in the Queens Criminal Court: An Experiment in
the Trial Docket Administration, 80 YALE L.J. 1637 (1971).
2In 1968, there were 27,292 drug arrests; in 1969, the number increased to 48,452
and by 1970, it reached epidemic proportions of 73,848 or 40% of all felony arrests.
People v. Simmons, 71 Misc. 2d 940, 377 N.Y.S.2d 717, 721 (1972).
x3 d. at 720.
"Id. at 719.
"As noted by the court in Simmons, "a centralized Grand Jury and petit jury
[was] envisioned when the statute [was] fully implemented." Id. at 721. This conclu-
sion is borne out by § 596 of the Judiciary Law in New York which continues to provide
that in order to qualify to serve as a juror, a person must be "a resident of the county."
N.Y. JuDicARY LAW § 596(1) (McKinney 1968).
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arrested and charged with an offense in Bronx County could be tried
in New York County by a jury selected exclusively from that geo-
graphic area.
A strict adherence to the California court's interpretation of the
vicinage provision would seem to render such a statutory scheme
violative of the provisions of the sixth amendment. Were the New
York legislature asked to comply with the Jones decision, it would be
compelled to choose between two alternative courses of action. It
could either abandon the traditional jury selection process and empa-
nel jurors from the entire area of New York City or it could revert to
separate county court systems. Unfortunately, neither alternative
appears conducive to efficient and effective judicial administration'
Moreover, the effect of Jones, if its reasoning is adopted by the
Supreme Court, is not likely to be limited to state court procedures
such as those in New York. Any constitutional requirement that ju-
rors, in all cases, must be drawn from an area which includes the
locality where the crime was committed would appear to seriously
threaten the validity of Rule 18 of the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure8 as promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to the
authority vested in it by Congress.u As amended in 1966, the rule
provides that the prosecution of all criminal cases must be within the
district where the acts occurred. It also vests in the court the author-
ity to fix the place of trial within the district. Although couched in
terms of venue, the amended rule, nevertheless, eliminates the re-
quirement that all criminal cases be tried in the particular division
in which the offense took place. Referring specifically to the vicinage
provision, the Official Comment to Rule 18 states:
The Sixth Amendment provides that the defendant shall have
the right to a trial "by an impartial jury of the State and
district wherein the crime shall have been committed which
district shall have been previously ascertained by
law. . . ."There is no constitutional right to a trial within the
division.89
The commentators go on to note that in many districts a judge is
"In order to allow city-wide juries in New York City, the existing county residency
requirement would have to be eliminated, for under present law, a resident of Bronx
County is not eligible to serve on juries sitting in New York County. See N.Y. JUDICIARY
LAW § 596(1) (McKinney 1968). Moreover, procedures would have to be developed to
deal with the overlapping jurisdiction of the various courts in the jury selection process.
7FED. R. CRIM. P. 18.
"18 U.S.C. § 3771 (1968).
"FED. R. CRIM. P. 18, Advisory Committee Note (1966).
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required to sit in several divisions and that, as a consequence, only
infrequent terms may be held in any particular division. As a result,
the original rule often caused undue delay in the disposition of crimi-
nal cases. This delay was considered extremely serious with respect
to defendants who were unable to secure release on bail.90
Whether the amended rule could continue to function if the Jones
decision were accepted by the United States Supreme Court certainly
seems open to question. It may be that a strict vicinage rule will
require all juries to be drawn on a district-wide basis, thus necessitat-
ing revision of the existing methods of jury selection.9 1 Alternatively,
the courts may be forced to return to the prior language of Rule 18
requiring trial in the division where the crime occurred. As pointed
out by the commentators, however, such action would not seem likely
to insure a speedy trial.
While the majority in Jones does concede that there may be an
"exceptional case,"92 where a defendant may be tried by a jury from
an area exclusive of the locality where the crimes were committed, it
fails to enumerate the standards applicable in determining when
such a case exists. If the mandate of the sixth amendment is, in fact,
"immutable, '93 it is doubtful whether such a case could ever be
found.
The California court's approach in People v. Jones raises difficult
questions regarding the efficient administration of our criminal court
system as well as the proper role of the jury in criminal prosecutions.94
The extent to which that decision may require an abandonment of
traditional centralized jury selection procedures in order to comply
with the requirements for a fair and speedy trial is not clear. The
obvious concern in Jones with the racial imbalance between the Cen-
tral and Southwest Districts may ultimately serve to limit the scope
of the California court's decision. Because of the racial overtones
which pervade the majority's opinion, it is uncertain whether the
same result would have been reached by the court had the population
characteristics of the two districts been substantially the same.15
"Id.
"Presently juries are drawn from either the district or division wherein the court
convenes. JUDICIARY Aar, 28 U.S.C. § 1861 (1970).
9108 Cal. Rptr. at 352.
"Id. at 351.
"How, for example, is the court to meet the requirements under the California
Code calling for trial within 60 days and the vicinage requirements of the sixth amend-
ment where, as in the case of the Central District, the criminal dockets are badly
overcrowded? See note 78 supra.
'"Whether the racial implications in the Jones case were, in fact, decisive, may
